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EDITOR'S NOTE: A forceful movement for revision of the New Mexico Constitution
exists in the state today. Official action includes work of the Constitutional Revision
Commission which has spent several years in sustained investigations and staff research.
The Commission recently made formidable reports to the New Mexico Legislature.
The following Article is the second of a series on revisions of the New Mexico Constitution.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS BY
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
ALBERT E. UTTON*

New Mexico has put into motion a serious inquiry into the question of revising its fundamental document-the constitution. In
1963 the Legislature authorized the establishment of a Constitutional Revision Commission' which has now made two comprehensive reports to the legislature.2 At this juncture it is pertinent to
review the constitutional position of the exercise of judicial functions
by administrative agencies. In so doing, this paper will briefly review
the doctrine of separation of powers, the practice in New Mexico
under our present constitution, and the practice in other states in
order to evaluate the relevant proposals of the Constitutional Revision Commission.
The two portions of the Commission's report which will thus be
evaluated are Article III and Article II, § 17, which read as follows:
Article II. Proposed Constitution. Section I. Distribution of Powers.
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three
distinct branches of government, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise
of powers properly belonging to one of these branches, shall exercise
any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in
this constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted.
Article II, Section 17. Judicial Review of Quasi-Judicial Administra-

tive Decisions. All quasi-judicial decisions of state administrative
agencies and commissions are subject to judicial review. The scope of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. This paper
owes a great deal to Cleopatra Campbell for her invaluable research assistance.
1. N.M. Laws 1963, Ch. 223 (terminating in 1965).
2. See Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission, 1964.
See Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission, 1967.
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review shall be as prescribed by law. In the absence of legislative
provision the matter shall not be heard de novo upon judicial review.

These two proposed provisions are acceptable and necessary, but
could be strengthened and clarified by a few minor changes.
A.

Separation of Powers
The doctrine of separation of powers is deeply embedded in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. The United States Constitution implicitly provides for the separation of powers ;8 nearly all state constitutions contain specific sections providing for the separation of
powers, 4 and New Mexico is no exception. 5
Montesquieu fathered the American adoption of the doctrine in
his treatise Spirit of the Laws which was published in 17480 and
which influenced the founding fathers. The fear of concentrating
power in a single class or group led to the doctrine of separation of
powers. There was a fear of an unchecked majority, and a conviction
that legislatures would be dangerous unless checked by a strong executive and judiciary. Thus, the idea of separation of powers was to
provide a system of checks and balances that would prevent tyranny
by any branch of government; this doctrine of separation of powers
is at the heart of our constitutional system. Montesquieu in his classic
statment said "When the legislative and executive powers are united

in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be
no liberty. .... -7
Typically, the New Mexico constitution states, "The powers of the
government of this state are divided into three distinct departments,
3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 1; and art. III, § 1.
4. The twelve states that do not include specific separation of powers in their constitutions are Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington and Wisconsin.
5. The New Mexico separation of powers clause is contained in art. III, § 1 of
the constitution:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one
of these departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either
of the others, except as in this Constitution otherwise expressly directed or
permitted.
6. Other illustrious thinkers on the subject who preceded Montesquieu include
Aristotle and John Locke. See Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers", 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 385, 386-93 (1935).
7. I. C. Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 174 (Nugent translation 1873).
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the legislative, executive and judicial ... ."s and goes on to say that
one department shall not exercise the powers of another department.
Although the U.S. Constitution does not contain an explicit separation of powers clause, it reaches the same result by granting the judicial, legislative, and executive powers to separate branches. Article
III § 1 of the United States Constitution proclaims "The Judicial
Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish."
With the rise of the administrative process, the courts have struggled with the problem of reconciling the exercise by administrative
agencies of adjudicatory functions with the separation of powers
doctrine. This was because of the apparent absoluteness of the
doctrine-separation meant absolute separation. But Montesquieu
himself pointed out that the three branches of government could not
be hermetically sealed from each other, and gave many instances of
the blending of functions.' Madison early argued against interpreting the doctrine absolutely on the basis that government could
be efficient only if it were made flexible by the blending of functions.' ° He perceptively concluded his observations in The Federalist Papers by saying:
From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly
be inferred, that in saying, "There can be no liberty, where the Legislative and Executive powers are united in the same person, or body

of magistrates"; or, "if the power of judging be not separated from
the Legislative and Executive powers," he did not mean that these
departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over
the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words impart, and
still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can
amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free

Constitution are subverted."
Madison realized that a doctrinaire adherence to a dogmatic
theory would impede the government, and even further, he feared
inflexibility would ultimately destroy the doctrine itself.
8. N.M. Const. art. 3, § 1, the section is quoted in full in note 5 supra.
9. Sharp, .supra note 6, at 389.
10. Id. at 407.
11. The Federalist No. 46, at 335-36 (Dawson ed. 1891) (Madison).
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There is no doubt that separation of powers is a touchstone of
our constitutional system, and in fact, as well as theory, the government is divided into a judiciary which judges, a legislature which
legislates, and an executive which carries out the laws of the land.
But when one goes beyond these general truths, he encounters
two problems. One is that of classification-can a function be classified as purely judicial or purely legislative? Secondly, are the three
branches exclusive of each other so that if a function can be definitely classified as judicial, for example, can any other branch perform that function ?12
There is no clear classification of functions which declares universally that a function is always judicial or legislative. For example,
the legislature at one time granted divorces, and it is now considered
to be a judicial task.' 3 Until 1955 in New Mexico an aggrieved taxpayer could only pay his property tax under protest and then institute court action for refund. 4 Now, he appeals his disputed valuation or assessment to the State Tax Commission."0 Then, if necessary, the district court reviews the decision of the Commission on
the record.
The granting of liquor licenses in New Mexico is done by an administrative agency,' 6 whereas in some jurisdictions it is done by the
7
courts.1
On occasion statutes have allowed disputes to be brought before
either a court or an agency for adjudication. In these cases the question of primary jurisdiction is raised.'
12. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 28 (1965).
13. J. Long, Domestic Relations § 218 (3d ed. 1923).
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-5-4 (Repl. 1961).
15. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-6-13.1 (Repl. 1961).
16. The Bureau of Revenue's Chief of the division of liquor control is charged
with responsibility for handling licenses. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 46-5-19 (1953).
17. England is one such jurisdiction: Licensing (Consolidation) Act of 1910, 10
Edw. 7 & 1 Geo. 5, c. 24, §§ 9, 10. Until the extra session of the legislature in 1937-38,
Georgia had the courts grant licenses. For an illustrative case, see State v. Justices of
the Inferior Court, 15 Ga. 408 (1854). New Jersey required court-granted licenses
until 1933. For an illustrative case, see Van Nortwick v. Bennett, 62 N.J. Law 151, 40
At. 689 (1898).
18. "The best-known example is that of reparation claims under the Interstate
Commerce Act [24 Stat. 382 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 9 (1964)] . . . . Under
that act, shippers seeking reparations for excessive freight may either bring a complaint
to the ICC or sue in court. . . ." R. Parker, Administrative Law 122 (1952). Another
typical provision is that contained in Ala. Code tit. 26, § 9 (1958), which deals with
the functions of the board of appeals of Alabama's department of industrial relations.
After the department has made a finding and issued an order that a machine, tool,
equipment, or structure of an employer is dangerous, the order may be appealed to the
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As Professor Jaffe points out, the distinctions between law making, law enforcing, and law judging do not fit neat logic-tight compartments. The logic of separation of powers is the "logic of polarity rather than strict classification."' 9
Jaffe goes on to illustrate with a taxation example:
Once the legislature has made the basic determination to tax "income" it becomes necessary, in collecting a tax, to determine whether
a receipt by the taxpayer is "income". What organ may exercise this
function? If the issue is one of fact, e.g., whether the receipt was on
account of a bill of goods or a gift from an admirer, the determination
cannot be made by the legislature. But such issues today are decided
either by the executive as an incident it is said to tax collection, or by
the judiciary as a determination of an amount owing by A to B. Suppose, however, that the disputed item is the purchase and cancellation
by a debtor of his debt of $100,000 for a payment to his creditor of
$90,000. Is the $10,000 "income"? As with the other question both
executive and judiciary do decide such a question. But so may the legislature. The court will announce the result as the decision in A v. B.
The legislature will lay down a general formula. But whichever way
it is done, it will be a "rule;" and probably the legislative enactment
may even reach back someway into the past and govern prior transactions. If the executive "executes" the law, so does the judiciary
....This becomes simply more evident, rather than more true, when
the executive is given power not only to adjudicate but to make rules
and regulations to carry out the general purpose of a statute.20
After considerable judicial wandering, the courts now have little
problem in allowing administrative agencies to exercise adjudicatory
functions so long as the judicial power to pass ultimately on the
question of what is lawful is reserved to the judiciary so as to provide a check on the other branches and satisfy the doctrine of separation of powers. Here in New Mexico, although one case specifically ruled that the establishment of a workman's compensation
board offended the separation of powers doctrine because the agency
would exercise adjudicatory powers, 2 the New Mexico courts have
board of appeals. "Any person affected by such order may, however, as an alternative
to an appeal to the board of appeals, appeal to the circuit court of the county in which
such machine, tool, equipment or structure is located .... " See Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
19. L. Jaffe, supra note 12, at 32.
20. Id. at 31-32.
21. State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Products Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d

1069 (1957).
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been reluctant to strike down the adjudicatory functions of administrative agencies while retaining in the courts the final power of
judicial review.
B.

New Mexico Experience
In discussing the administrative agencies of New Mexico, it is
helpful to divide them into the two major divisions recognized by
the New Mexico Supreme Court. The two divisions are: (1) agencies or boards created by the New Mexico Constitution; (2) legislatively-created agencies. Each of these recognized divisions will be
considered separately in the material that follows.
Also, special attention will be given to the distinction articulated
in State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Products Co. v. Mechem,22 between
so-called "public rights" (where the agency seeks to protect rights
of the public at large) and "private rights" (where the agency determines the rights of two opposing private parties). Specifically,
severe doubts will be raised as to the relevance of such a distinction.
In the Mechem case, the court specifically ruled that the legislation establishing a workmen's compensation board was unconstitutional because it would decide disputes between private individuals
which must be decided by the courts. It went on to say that the only
disputes with which administrative agencies could deal are those involving public rights, i.e. disputes between the public and the individual. The court gave as examples of agencies adjudicating rights
under the police power for the protection of public interest in general: "boards regulating common carriers, transportation, telephone
rates, Barber Boards, Medical Boards, Boards of Registration, Tax
' 23
Boards, Division of Liquor Control, etc.
I
CONSTITUTIONAL AGENCIES

The New Mexico Constitution creates the following boards and
commissions:
1. The State Highway Commission, Art. V, § 14.
2. The State Corporation Commission, Art. XI, § 1.
3. The State Board of Education, Art. XII, § 6.
4. The State Department of Public Education, Art. XII, § 6.
22. 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957).
23. Id. at 252, 316 P.2d at 1070.
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5. The Boards of Regents, Art. XII, § 13.
6. The Department of Agriculture, Art. XV, § 1.
A.

State Corporation Commission
The State Corporation Commission holds the record for having
been involved in more litigation than any other agency be it created
by the Constitution or otherwise. Its authority and decisions have
been frequently challenged in the courts. Art. XI § 7 of the Constitution gives the Corporation Commission powers to determine rates
of "railway, express, telegraph, telephone, sleeping-car and other
transportation and transmission companies and common carriers
within the state," to require that the companies provide adequate
facilities, to make rules, and to hold hearings connected with carrying out these duties. A review of the cases involving the Commission
reveals that this agency has been allowed to exercise powers cutting
across the three lines of governmental authority: judicial, legislative, and executive.
As an agency created by the Constitution, the New Mexico courts
have ruled that the limitations on powers of government imposed
elsewhere in the Constitution are not applicable to the Corporation
Commission. The Constitutional basis of this commission allows it
to exercise all powers, whatever their nature, in the disposition of
issues related to transportation and transmission companies.24 The
only limitation appears to be that built into the Constitution itself:
orders of the Commission are enforceable by the Supreme Court. 2
The Supreme Court has ruled consistently that it will enforce the
orders of the Commission unless they are shown to be arbitrary,
capricious, or in violation of the rights guaranteed
by the United
26
States or the New Mexico Constitution.
As a consequence of the court interpretations of Corporation
Commission powers, it is possible to view the Corporation Commission as almost a fourth branch of state government. This may be
suggested because the Commission's status as a constitutional agency
created at the same time as the executive, legislative and judicial
elements of the government makes it in pari materia with the traditional branches. And in fact the Supreme Court has said as much. In
24. In re Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 37 N.M. 194, 20 P.2d 918 (1933).
25. N.M. Const. art. XI, § 7 (1964).
26. E.g., State v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 54 N.M. 315, 224 P.2d 155
(1950) ; Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 63 N.M. 137, 315 P.2d 894
(1957) ; Bennett v. State Corp. Comm'n, 73 N.M. 126, 385 P.2d 978 (1963).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

VOL. 7

a case involving another Constitutional agency, the Board of Education, the court has said that Agencies created by the Constitution
are not subject to the separation of powers doctrine. The court said
"All constitutional provisions have equal dignity . . . and it was

within the power of the framers of the constitution to confer on this
constitutional body such limited judicial powers . . 7
The Commission, in adherence to its constitutional duties, actually performs legislative acts.28
It also operates as a tribunal in determining the rights of not only
the public but also of private parties.
The Corporation Commission exists to protect the public interest,
but it is subject to judicial review by the courts, since it must apply
to the Supreme Court to enforce its orders. 29 The "public interest"
has been deemed to include such questions as the need for granting
additional or new routes to trucking companies in competition with
companies already operating over these routes. For example, in
Harris v. State Corporation Commission,"0 Harris attempted to
prevent the issuance of a certificate of public necessity and convenience to Dalby Motor Freight Lines. Theoretically, it was the public
need that was determinative of the issue, but grave doubts arise to
any supposition that private rights are not also being determined
since the decision was between the applicant and the existing carrier.
The already existing carrier had at least temporary success in opposing the granting of a competing certificate in Transcontinental
Bus System, Inc. v. State Corporation Commission.31 There are numerous examples in the law reports in which the Commission was
considering applications that were opposed by a carrier already operating over a similar route. 2
From the early days of statehood the New Mexico Supreme
Court has held that the Commission's determination of rates and of
facilities to be afforded is a legislative question, but the reasonableness and lawfulness of these requirements is a judicial question. 3
27. McCormick v. Board of Education, 58 N.M. 648, 660, 274 P.2d 299, 307 (1954).
28. Seaberg v. Raton Public Service Co., 36 N.M. 59, 8 P.2d 100 (1932).
29. State v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 54- N.M. 315, 224 P.2d 155 (1950).
30. 46 N.M. 352, 129 P.2d 323 (1942).
31. 56 N.M. 158, 241 P.2d 829 (1952).
32. See Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 60 N.M. 114, 288 P.2d
440 (1955); Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 63 N.M. 137, 314 P.2d
894 (1957) ; Garrett Freight Lines v. State Corp. Comm'n, 63 N.M. 48, 312 P.2d 1061
(1957).
33. Seward v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry., 17 N.M. 557, 131 Pac. 980 (1913).
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Thus the court clearly recognizes the adjudicatory nature of commission deliberations.
B.

State Highway Commission
While the State Highway Commission, as created by Art. V, § 14
of the Constitution, has a sweeping power over road construction
and maintenance in the state, it has little authority or need to exercise judicial powers. Furthermore, what powers the State Highway
Commission exercises have been the subject of very infrequent law
suits.
C.

State Board of Education, State Department of
Public Education, Board of Regents
Art. XII, § 6 (as amended 1958) creates the State Department
of Public Education and the State Board of Education. In contrast
to the specific duties assigned the State Corporation Commission,
the Board of Education is given very general duties. The State
Board is directed to "determine public school policy and vocational
educational policy" and is given "control, management and direction
of all public schools pursuant to authority and powers provided by
4

law."

3

Among the powers given by statute to the State Board of Education is the authority "To suspend or revoke teachers' certificates for
incompetency, immorality or for any good and just cause ... after
service of charges upon the accused person and hearing or opportunity to be heard shall have been given the accused." '35
The most important case squarely dealing with the constitutional
powers of the Board of Education is McCormick v. Board of Education of Hobbs Municipal School DistrictNo. 1 6.36 In McCormick,
a teacher whose dismissal by the local school board had been reversed by the State Board of Education successfully sought a writ
of mandamus to force the local school board to obey the order of
the state board. To the contention that the State Board of Education was exercising judicial powers in violation of the separation of
powers clause in the Constitution, the New Mexico Supreme Court
said:
34.
changes
35.
36.

The 1958 amendment involved matters of membership on the board rather than
in the powers of the board.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 73-1-7 (Supp. 1965).
58 N.M. 648, 274 P.2d 299 (1954).
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There is no merit to this contention. All constitutional provisions
have equal dignity. . . .The State Board of Education is created
under Art. 12, N.M. Const., and it was within the power of the
framers of the constitution to confer upon this constitutional body
such limited judicial powers as it deemed proper. Such judicial powers
as have been conferred upon the State Board of Education by the legislature pursuant to [N.M. § 73-1-1] fall clearly within the constitutional authority conferred upon the State Board of Education ...
Even without the assistance of the grant of power contained in the
New Mexico Constitution, other states have reached the same conclusion under statutes similar to the New Mexico statute. ....
.7

More clearly than in any other case the New Mexico court explained the judicial authority of administrative agencies created by
the Constitution. Decisions reached by the State Board of Education are accorded the same status as those reached by the State Corporation Commission: They will not be overturned unless they are
"arbitrary, unlawful, unreasonable or capricious. 38
No cases have been found where the judicial powers of the boards
of regents of the state educational institutions have been tested.
Since Art. XII, § 13, which establishes the boards of regents, gives
them "the control and management" of the respective institutions,
wording similar to the authority given the State Board of Education, it is probable that in a judicial test, the regents would be found
to have the judicial powers equal to those of the State Board of Education.
State Department of Agriculture
A cursory review of the indices to the state constitution and to
the New Mexico statutes reveals that a "department of agriculture"
as envisioned in the constitution has been an oasis of perversion of
the constitutional intent. Article XV, § 1 of the constitution says
there "shall be" a department of agriculture under control of the
Board of Regents of the College of Agriculture and Mechanical
Arts. The statutes delegating power to the Board of Regents give
the regents supervision of the administration and enforcement of all
agricultural and horticultural laws. The agricultural and horticultural laws purport to create all types of county-level agencies and

D.

37. Id. at 660-61, 274- P.2d at 307.
38. McCormick v. Board of Educ., Note 27 supra; Swisher v. Darden, 59 N.M.
511, 287 P.2d 73 (1955).
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agents. The Board of Regents in some cases has power to make determinations of the standards for agricultural products and to seize
substandard products. 3 9 The Board of Regents has power also (1)

to license fumigation companies ;40 (2) to register (and hold hearings in connection with refusal to register) "economic poisons";",
(3) to issue "stop-sale" orders on seeds (no hearing required) ;42
(4) to cancel fertilizer registrations (after hearings), 43 and (5) to
appoint a director of the Cotton District Act who administers the
Act, holding hearings on proposed orders." No litigation testing
these powers seems to exist.
Not related directly to the Board of Regents, but of particular
curiosity is the 1957 act creating a "state grasshopper control
board. ' 45 Among other powers, it has the power to "Compromise,
settle or pay just claims arising from negligent operations under the
' 46
Grasshopper Control Act."

It is readily apparent that the Board of Regents under the mantle
of the Constitutional provision for a Department of Agriculture is
exercising far reaching judicial functions that often are related to
the state's police power.
II
LEGISLATIVELY CREATED ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Since statehood, the New Mexico Legislature has established
both temporary agencies and relatively permanent ones. Into the
category of temporary grants of "legislative power" might be placed
the Boundary Commission and the State Loan Board. In each case
the acts of the boards were declared to be non-violations of the
state constitution. In State ex rel Clancy v. Hall47 the efforts of the

Boundary Commission in attempting to settle a boundary dispute
with the State of Colorado were said to be merely the delegation of
power to "agents" of the legislature, while in State v. Kelly48 the
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

For example, pecans, under N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-18-4 (Repl. 1966).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-8-9 (Repl. 1966).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-9-4 (Repl. 1966).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-12-16 (Repl. 1966).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-13-25 (Rep!. 1966).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-24-4 (Repl. 1966).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-8-15 (Repl. 1966).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-8-17(G) (Repl. 1966).
State ex rel. Clancy v. Hall, 23 N.M. 422, 168 P. 715 (1917).
State v. Kelly, 27 N.M. 412, 202 P. 524 (1921).
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acts of the State Loan Board in determining claims were given as
some examples of types of claims said to be administrative and
not judicial.
Perhaps of most interest in an inquiry of the exercise of judicial
powers by state agencies are the cases involving the Oil Conservation Commission, the Public Utilities Commission, and the Employment Security Commission.
A.

Oil Conservation Commission
As early as 1909, the Territorial Legislature created a Conservation Commission. In 1935, this commission was overtaken by the
creation of the Oil Conservation Commission with the "jurisdiction
and authority over all matters relating to the conservation of oil
and gas and the prevention of waste of potash as a result of oil or
gas operations in this state." 49 The Commission was given extensive
powers to regulate the production and storage of gas and oil, to
control the use of water in production, to set limits on oil and gas
pools, and to adopt safety measures in the production of oil and gas
in order to prevent waste and to protect "correlative rights." The
statutes include what is called "compulsory pooling" of interests in
an oil or gas field. 50 To perform these duties, the Commission was
given authority to hold hearings, make rules, and enforce its rules.
In 1962 the first case involving the powers of the Oil Conservation Commission was decided by the New Mexico Supreme Court.
Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Commission"' involved a
dispute over natural gas allowables for various producers in a pool.
Upon the application of one producer the Commission permitted a
change in the gas proration formula. Other producers attacked the
change in formula. In effect, the Commission was determining "correlative rights" of several producers in the particular gas pool, but
the Commission called this a legislative function.12 The Commission's order was held to be void, NOT because of constitutional
limitations on the Commission, but because the Commission failed
49. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-5 (Supp. 1965).
50. See generally, Morris, Compulsory Pooling ot Oil and Gas Interests in New
Mexico, 3 Natural Resources J. 316 (1963).
51. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
52. Id. at 323, 373 P.2d at 818:
From a practical standpoint, the legislature cannot define, in cubic feet, the
property right of each owner of natural gas in New Mexico. It must, of necessity, delegate this legislative duty to an administrative body such as the commission. (emphasis added).
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to make the findings required by law. The court dealt specifically
with the powers of the Commission to determine "the merits of any
controversy" :
If the protection of correlative rights were completely separate from
the prevention of waste, then there might be no need in having the
commission as a party; but if such were true, it is very probable that
the commission would be performing a judicial function, i.e. determining property rights, and grave constitutional problems would arise.
For the same reason, it must follow that, just as the commission cannot perform a judicial function, neither can the court perform an administrative one. 53
However, the court's distinction does not withstand close scrutiny
of the difference between proration and proration formula. Proration establishes the maximum production allowable from the field
and is a legislative function. The proration formula merely divides
the allowable production of the field between the various individual
producers. Thus, once the maximum allowable production figure is
established for the field, the "divying up" or determination of correlative rights of the individual producers is an adjudicatory function.54 It is a resolution of a dispute between private parties. But it
is very desirable to have the expertise of the Commission brought to
bear in making this determination. So the court arrived at the right
decision for the wrong reasons. It allowed the administrative agency
to exercise an adjudicatory function by calling it legislative. It would
be far better to recognize that there is good reason for having the
initial decision made by a specialized body with expert competence
in the area, but subject to judicial review by the courts. In this way,
the court on review has the advantage of the expertise of the administrative agency; equally important is the consideration that the
court's time is not dissipated by the initial fact finding. The judiciary
is thereby better able to perform its generalist function of reviewing
judicially the disputes of the entire governmental structure. The
court in Continentalaccomplished these goals of utilizing the experience of a specialist body and taking the maximum advantage of its
time by supervising the action of the administrative agency on review, but the court used the wrong reasons.
Since one of the duties of the Commission is to prevent waste, the
53. Id. at 324, 373 P.2d at 818.
54. For a discussion of the resolution of disputes between private parties, see Comment, 3 Natural Resources J. 178 (1963).
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court's decision indicates that it will allow the Commission to adjudicate correlative rights so long as the Commission remembers to
make prevention of waste the basis of its decision so that the court
can call it a legislative act. This fiction then not unexpectedly led the
court to compound the confusion by saying the judiciary could not
review by a de novo hearing the decision of the Commission since it
would be thereby performing an administrative act. Review by the
courts of administrative agency actions is the very essence of the
judicial power that must be preserved under the separation of powers doctrine. Judicial review can be carried out either by a de novo
hearing or review on the record. Theoretically either form of judicial supervision satisfies the separation of powers doctrine even
though de novo review is not satisfactory practically. De novo review is a duplication of effort, burdening the courts with the fact
finding chores of the agency. It robs the court of the time it could
better use, and it robs the administrative agency of the responsibility that is necessary to perform in an effective fashion. If the administrative agency hearing is a mere redundancy, the hearing becomes
a mere formality with neither the parties nor the agency taking it
seriously. If an agency is to perform responsibly, it must be given
responsibility.
In spite of the muddy reasoning, the court did exercise its judicial
power by judicial review, and it did allow the administrative agency
to perform its adjudicatory function of dredging up the facts and
making an initial decision based on them and its specialized experience; and it avoided the wastefulness of a de novo hearing.
The fictional approach of the court permits the reasoning in Continental to be in harmony with the Mechem private v. private right
distinction. By using the phrase "prevention of waste" to bring the
determination of correlative rights under the umbrella of the public
interest, the court in effect says that adjudication is between the
public and an individual and not between two private parties.55
B.

Public Utilities Commission
The Public Utilities Commission was created by the legislature in

55. The Commission had the lesson of Continental Oil repeated a year later in
Sims v. Mechem, 72 N.M. 186, 382 P.2d 183 (1963). In Sims, the order of the Commission had been made prior to Continental Oil and the Commission had again failed
to include the prevention of waste as a reason for its decision. The order was declared
void. For a recent case explaining the Continental decision, see El Paso Natural Gas
Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 76 N.M. 268, 414 P.2d 496 (1966).
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1941 and given the "power and jurisdiction to regulate and supervise every public utility in respect to its rates and service regulations
...
79" Only two cases discussing the powers of the Commission
have been found, but both of these concerned the exhaustion of statutory remedies: Smith v. Southern Union Gas Co.,5 7 and Potash
Company of America v. New Mexico Public Service Commission."'
In Smith, the argument that the request for relief from discriminatory rates was one for the courts was answered by the statement
that the role of the Public Utilities Commission in hearing rate
questions merely postponed the jurisdiction of the courts; the Commission could constitutionally pass first on a charge of discrimination
and award damages for charging discriminatory rates.
In Potash Company, the real dispute was between the potash
company and the Southern Union Gas Company over a rate contract. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
complaint because of the potash company's failure to exhaust its
statutory remedies. Speaking of the action then pending before the
trial court, the New Mexico Supreme Court said that the trial court
would "be called upon to render some important decisions on how
far the Commission may go in changing a so-called contract rate,
after the public interest has entered the equation."5 This rather
ambiguous language leaves it uncertain what "public interest" the
court had in mind: the concern for holding the line on all rates; concern for the welfare of the Potash Company, or of the Southern
Union Gas Company; or, reminiscent of Continental Oil, supra, the
justification for permitting the administrative agency the power to
settle disputes between two private parties. At any rate, the requirement of exhaustion of remedies made the hearing of the specialist
agency meaningful, and preserved the court's role of exercising the
judicial power to deter any abuse of administrative discretion.
C.

Employment Security Commission
The New Mexico Legislature created the Employment Security
Commission in 1936, and established a comprehensive scheme for
the determination of the validity of claims for unemployment compensation. The claimant and any interested parties can have the decision of a deputy reviewed (1) by appeal tribunals set up by the
56. N.M. Stat. Ann. §68-5-4 (Supp. 1965).
57. 58 N.M. 197, 269 P.2d 745 (1954).
58. 62 N.M. 1, 303 P.2d 908 (1956).
59. Id. at 9, 303 P.2d at 913 (emphasis added).
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Commission; (2) by the Commission itself, and (3) in the courts.60
The constitutionality of the procedure stipulated for decision
making and appeals has never been tested. The cases dealing with
the Employment Security Commission have concerned primarily the
scope of review of the courts and have assumed the constitutionality
of the commission's operation in handling disputed claims." The
disposition of disputed claims frequently requires resolving conflicts
between the former employee on the one hand and the former employer on the other hand.6 2
D. State Engineer
Although the New Mexico Constitution has a section dealing with
irrigation and water rights, 63 it says nothing about any administration of water laws by a state officer. However, the office of state engineer pre-dates the state constitution; it was established in 190564
and incorporated as part of an exhaustive statutory plan enacted by
the territorial legislature in 1907.6" The law of 1907 declares:
He [the engineer] shall have general supervision of the waters of the
Territory and of the measurement, appropriation, and distribution
thereof, and such other duties as are required by this act. 66
The New Mexico Supreme Court has held consistently that the
State Engineer cannot adjudicate private water rights." However,
parties wishing to appropriate surface water are required to apply
to the State Engineer for a permit.6 8 The statutes provide that hearings may be held in connection with surface water applications.6 9
After the hearing on an application for surface water, the State Engineer rejects the application if "there is no unappropriated water
available" or if "approval thereof would be contrary to the public
60. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-9-6 (Repl. 1960).
61. Two recent cases are Parsons v. Employment Security Comm'n, 71 N.M. 405,
379 P.2d 57 (1963) and Wilson v. Employment Security Comm'n, 74 N.M. 3, 389 P.2d
855 (1963).

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Informal discussions with Commission officials.
N.M. Const. art. XVI.
N.M. Laws 1905, ch. 102, § 11.
N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 49, § 4.
Id. The wording of the 1907 statute is repeated almost verbatim in the current

statutory powers of the State Engineer. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-2-1 (1953).
67. Public Service Co. v. Reynolds, 68 N.M. 54, 358 P.2d 621 (1960) ; Reynolds v.
Wiggins, 74 N.M. 670, 397 P.2d 469 (1964) ; Durand v. Reynolds, 75 N.M. 497, 406
P.2d 817 (1965).
68. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-1 (1953).
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interest. '70 In the case of ground waters, no hearing is required unless someone files a protest within a set time.7 ' If a protest is filed
a hearing is held in the district court and the decision is "binding on
the state engineer. ' 72 Formerly the decision was made by the State
Engineer himself after a hearing.7"
As Professor Clark observes,
While there can be no question about the actual and final adjudicatory function being one for the courts, it is also clear that the State
Engineer is charged with making the initial and factual determinations upon which, in large part, any adjudication will rest. As a prac-

tical matter this means that a very large number of water "rights" in
New Mexico have been and are being passed on at the administrative
the only "determinalevel. This administrative decision is normally
74
tion" that is ever made of such rights.

He goes on to say:
the essence of judicial adjudication in western water rights matters
is the fixing of priorities and this question is not ordinarily raised until the supply is no longer adequate.. . . The holder of a permit from
the State Engineer, and persons who have properly declared old water rights on file, have legal rights even though the quantum and priority of75 each right may not be determined until an eventual adjudication.
Thus it can be said that the "Private-Public rights" distinction of
69. N.M. Stat. Ann. §75-5-5 (1953) indirectly assumes a hearing on surface water
applications:
[T]he state engineer shall determine from the evidence presented by the parties interested, . . . whether there is unappropriated water available for the
benefit of the applicant.
70. N.M. Stat. Ann. §75-5-6 (1953).
71. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-3 (Supp. 1967) provides:
After the expiration of the time for filing objections, if no such objections
shall have been filed, the state engineer shall, if he finds that . . . the proposed appropriation would not impair existing water rights from such source,
grant the said application . ...
If objections or protests have been filed . . . or if the State Engineer is of
the opinion that the permit should not be issued, the state engineer shall notify
the applicant of that fact. . ..
72. N.M. Stat. Ann. 75-11-3 (Supp. 1967).
73. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-3 (1953).
74. Clark, New Mexico Water Law Since 1955, 2 Natural Resources J. 484, 540-41
(1962). (Footnotes omitted; emphasis in the original.)
75. Id. at 541-42. (Footnotes omitted.)
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the Mechem case 78 is not offended by the statutory mandate of the
State Engineer since his decisions are predicated on the public interest, 77 but one wonders whether in reality the public-private dis-

tinction is meaningful since the State Engineer is to deny applications that would impair existing rights 78 ; this unavoidably puts the

administrative agency in the position of deciding between two or
more private parties for the same water. Whatever the theory, we,
in fact, have the State Engineer deciding the issues because he is
best equipped to do the job. The complex hydrologic, geologic, engineering and economic considerations require a specialist to guard
this precious resource in a water-thirsty state.
And the judiciary plays its proper role of exercising the judicial
power by reviewing the decision of the State Engineer. The abuse of
administrative discretion is deterred by judicial review and thereby
checks and balances required by the doctrine of separation of powers are provided.
Most recently Kelley v. CarlsbadIrrigationDistrict7 9 established
the scope of judicial review of the State Engineer's decisions. This
standard is consistent with the standards for reviewing other agencies.8 0
The courts in reviewing the State Engineer are to see whether he
(1) acted arbitrarily, fraudulently, capriciously; (2) based his decision on substantial evidence; (3) acted within the scope of his
authority, and (4) made any error of law."' The court's decisions
concerning the State Engineer have woven a fine line that is consistent with the Mechem-private v. public rights-theory which at the
same time allows the State Engineer's expertise to be used effectively and the court's time and special experience to be used most efficiently. However, clearer thinking and thus better law would result
if the always tenuous and oft times illusory public v. private rights
76.
77.

See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
This is consistent with the court's public interest "prevention of waste" ra-

tionale for approving the decision of the Oil Conservation Commission in Continental
Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Commission (see note 51 supra and accompanying text).
Also, it should be noted that the State Engineer acts under the constitutional "police
powers" to protect the public interest, State ex rel. Erickson v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264,

308 P.2d 983 (1957) ; State ex rel. Reynolds v. W.S. Ranch Co., 69 N.M. 169, 364 P.2d
1036 (1961).
78. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-1 (Supp. 1965), quoted in part, supra note 70.
79. 76 N.M. 466, 415 P.2d 849 (1966).
80. See Kelley v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 71 N.M. 464, 379 P.2d 763 (1963). But
see note 104 infra.
81. Kelley v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 76 N.M. 466, 415 P.2d 849, 852 (1966).
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distinctions were dropped in favor of a candid recognition that the
administrative agency exercises adjudicatory functions which are
subject to the check of the judicial power exercised by courts.
E.

Division of Liquor Control
Under its police powers New Mexico has established numerous
agencies to protect the public safety and welfare. Illustrative are the
Division of Liquor Control and occupational and professional licensing boards.
The control of liquor in New Mexico is placed under the Bureau
of Revenue. The statutes regulating liquor include a declaration that
liquor is to be "controlled so as to protect the public health, safety
and morals of every community. 8 2 To carry out this policy, the
chief of the division of liquor control is authorized to issue or refuse
to issue licenses and to revoke, suspend or cancel any license, not only
if the licensee has violated the statutes, but also if he has violated
any "valid regulation" announced by the chief or by the commissioner of revenue."' An elaborate plan for hearings on suspected violations is set out in the statutes.84 An appeal to the District Court in
Santa Fe is permitted. The district court can set aside a decision of
the chief of liquor control if (1) it is arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion; (2) it is in excess of statutory jurisdiction, or
(3) it is unsupported by substantial evidence.85 This is the same
scope of review accorded to decisions of other administrative agencies.
The decisions of the chief of liquor control have been called at
different times "ministerial," 86 quasi judicial but "essentially administrative,"8 7 and that of a "special tribunal."8 8 Perhaps the best
pronouncement on the type of duty the chief of liquor control performs is in Kearns v. Aragon,89 a judicial review of a license revocation because of a Sunday sale:
A proceeding before the Chief to revoke a liquor license is not a criminal proceeding; rather it is an administrative proceeding in the na82. N.M. Stat. Ann. §46-5-1 (Repl. 1966).
83. N.M. Stat. Ann. §46-2-4 (Repl. 1966).
84. N.M. Stat. Ann. §46-6-4 (Repl. 1966).
85. N.M. Stat. Ann. §46-6-6 (Repl. 1966).
86. Floeck v. Bureau of Revenue, 44 N.M. 194, 199, 100 P.2d 225, 227 (1940).
87. Chiordi v. Jernigan, 46 N.M. 396, 401, 129 P.2d 640, 643 (1942).
88. Taggader v. Montoya, 54 N.M. 18, 22, 212 P.2d 1049, 1052 (1949).
89. 65 N.M. 119, 333 P.2d 607 (1958).
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ture of a civil action. [citing cases.] This is true even though the
charge and ground for revocation is the violation of a penal statute.
[citing cases.]
Nor is the object of an administrative proceeding to revoke a liquor
license intended as a punishment of the licensee ....
State control of
the liquor business under the police power is so great as to range from
complete prohibition to lesser degrees of regulation and constant surveillance. 90

In support of the broad powers given the liquor chief, the New
Mexico court has consistently held that a liquor license is not a
property right.9 1
F.

Other Licensing Boards
The New Mexico Legislature has enacted statutes requiring licensing of many occupations and professions, including merchants,9 2
real estate agents, 93 hotelkeepers and restauranteurs,9 4 peddlers,9"
pugilists,96 auctioneers,9 7 barbers,9 s plumbers,9 9 and the usual "professions" (except clergymen). 10 0 Most of the occupations are regulated by boards of commissioners or examiners. Uniformly there
has been little litigation in this area.
Licensing for the operation of motor vehicles is a related area.
90.
91.

Id. at 123, 333 P.2d at 609-10.
Floeck v. Bureau of Revenue, supra note 86; Chiordi v. Jernigan, supra note

87.
92. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-1-1, -5 (Repl. 1960). The latter statute (§ 60-1-5) provides that
Every person, firm or corporation who is required to pay an occupation or license tax other than for the sale of liquors, shall, before doing business, make
out an application, stating the names of the applicants, the character of the
business for which the license is desired. ...
93. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-1-2, -5 (Repl. 1960).
94. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-1-3, -5 (Repl. 1960).
95. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-2-1 to -16 (Repl. 1960).
96. The licensing comes by implication through requiring the promoter of the fight
to obtain a permit from the county boxing commission. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-7-2 to -4
(Repl. 1960).
97. Strangely, it appears that the statutes require an auctioneer to be licensed only
when he is conducting a jewelry auction, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 67-13-5 to -12 (Repl. 1961).
98. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-14-1 (Repl. 1961).
99. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-22-8 (Supp. 1965).
100. Physicians: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-5-12 (Repl. 1961) ; dentists: N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 67-4-5 (Repl. 1961) ; architects: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-12-1 (Repl. 1961) ; public accountants: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-23-8 (Repl. 1961) ; attorneys: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-26
(Supp. 1965).
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The Division of Motor Vehicles and the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles are given powers of issuing licenses and revoking or suspending licenses. Hearings preliminary to suspension or revocation
are not required although the licensee does have the right to a hearing after suspension or revocation.' 01 Appeals of the decision of the
agency can be made to the district court. 10 2
Johnson v. Sanchez 0 3 is one of the few cases considering the suspension powers of the division of motor vehicles, and it well could
apply to all licensing boards. Lillard Johnson was appealing the sixmonth suspension of his driver's license. The New Mexico Supreme
Court determined that the issues presented were (1) what kind of
hearing in the district court was required, and (2) was the statute
authorizing suspension of the license constitutional. The court held
(1) the statutes were constitutional, and (2) the scope of judicial
review was, essentially, the same as for other administrative agencies: that is, did the agency act on substantial evidence, within its
jurisdiction, and without fraud, arbitrariness, or capriciousness.' 4
On the nature of the action taken by the division, the court said:
We can see no great difference between the cases involving appeals
from the administrative action of the corporation commission or the
liquor director than those from the commissioner of motor vehicles.
The suspension of an operator's license, even though perhaps quasi
judicial, is purely an administrative act and not a judicial duty. 105
The court has been less concerned with the exercise of judicial functions by administrative agencies when it could characterize the
agency as being under the police power. This is understandable since
in most "police power" agencies the dispute is generally between
the state or public and the individual rather than between individuals, and is thus consistent with the Mechem distinction between
private and public rights.
None the less, the agencies often exercise judicial functions which
101. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-13-60 (Repl. 1960).
102. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-13-65 (Repl. 1960).
103. 67 N.M. 41, 351 P.2d 449 (1960).
104. Some ambiguous language concerning the scope of review is contained in
Wilson v. Employment Security Comm'n, 74 N.M. 3, 389 P.2d 855 (1963). Wilson suggests that perhaps all administrative agencies are not bound by the same review standards.
105. Supra note 103, at 49, 351 P.2d at 454. On the question of administrative action, see generally Johnston, The Administrative Hearing For the Suspension of a
Driver's License, 30 N.C.L. Rev. 27 (1951).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

VOL. 7

are not unlike those of a criminal court in assessing penalties for
breaches of the criminal code, or civil courts adjudicating between
two parties when they grant a license for a new bus route or establish the proration formula in an oilfield. The point being that agencies perform specialized tasks that often are of a judicial nature:
There is nothing wrong with this if adequate review by the courts
is provided. As the court said in Johnson v. Sanchez, "there is no
denial of due process of law resulting from placing the power to revoke or suspend . . . [a driving license] in an administrative officer.
• .. The licensee's right of review . . .is his sufficient protection
that powers will be reasonably and fairly administered.' ' 10 6
Of course, if adequate review of administrative decision and procedural safeguards are not provided, abuses to the rights of individuals are likely to occur." 7 The courts have frequently struck
down agency actions when inadequate procedural safeguards such
as notice, hearing, and findings were not provided.'0 8 In so doing the
courts are performing a necessary function-a check on the abuse
of administrative discretion.
G.

Practice in other Jurisdictions
The doctrine of separation of powers is explicitly contained in
most state constitutions, and the language used in the New Mexico
constitution is similar to that in 37 states. Nine states have almost
identical phraseology,' 9 and twenty-eight others use similar lan0
guage."
106. Johnson v. Sanchez, supra note 103, at 46-47, 351 P.2d at 452.
107. For a criticism of powers exercised by the California Department of Motor
Vehicles, see note, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 822 (1960).
108. See the cases collected in 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §2.10
(1958) and pocket parts (1965) ; also see 1 F. Cooper, State Administrative Law 82
(1965).
109. The New Mexico Constitution, art. III, § 1 reads:
The powers of government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection
of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of
the others, except as in the Constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted.
Almost identical phraseology is used in the Cal. Const. art. III, § 1; Colo. Const. art.
III, Idaho Const. art. II, § 1; Iowa Const. art. III, § 1; Mont. Const. art. IV, § 1; Neb.
Const. art. II, § 1; Nev. Const. art. III, § 1; Utah Const. art. V, § 1; and Wyo. Const.
art. 2, § 1.
110. States using similar language are: Ala. Const. art. III, §42; Ariz. Const. art.
11; Ark. Const. art. IV, §§ 1, 2; Conn. Const. art. II; Fla. Const. art. II; Ill. Const.
art. III; Ind. Const. art. III, § 1; Mass. Const. art. III, § 1; Miss. Const. art. 1, §§ 1,
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Twelve state constitutions, like the federal constitution, establish
the three separate branches of government, but do not have an in-

dependent separation of powers clause."' Interestingly, the New
Hampshire Constitution calls for the three branches to be as sepa-

rate "as the nature of a free government will admit, or as it is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of
construction in one indissoluble bond . . .,
There are different
variations in other states, but in all the separation of powers doctrine has validity and vitality.
In the early days of this century, the courts had considerable difficulty reconciling the exercise of judicial functions by administrative
agencies with the doctrine of the separation of powers. Illustrative
of the early probing of the problem is the Illinois case of Courter v.
Simpson Construction Co.," 3 in which the court refused to review
questions of law involved in the decision of a workmen's compensation commission because the court could not consider a non-judicial
question, i.e., one decided by a non-judicial tribunal. A diametrically opposite approach was often taken by which the court held that
an administrative agency could not make a decision because it was
adjudicatory and not administrative." 4 So, in some instances, it was
held the courts had no authority over decisions even for review purposes, because the court said decisions were administrative, while
other courts said the administrative agencies had no authority over
similar decisions since they were judicial.
This confusion was understandable since there is no genuine difference between a court's determining whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment for purposes of ascertaining
vicarious liability of an employer in a tort claim," 5 and the administrative agency's determining whether an accident "arose out of and
was in the course of the employment of the employee," 1 6 in applying
2; Mo. Const. art. II, § 1; N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. 37; N.J. Const. art. III, § 1; N.C.
Const. art. I, § 8; Okla. Const. art. IV, § 1; Ore. Const. art. III, § 1; R.I. Const. art.
III; S.C. Const. art. I, § 14; S.D. Const. art. II; Tenn. Const. art. II, § 1; Tex. Const.
art. III, § 1; Vt. Const. ch. II, § 5; Va. Const. art. III, § 39, and W.Va. Const. art. V,
§1.
111. Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin.
112. N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. 37.
113. 264 Ill. 488, 106 N.E. 350 (1914).
114. Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 156 Pac. 491 (1916).
115. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Noppenberger, 171 Md. 378, 189 A. 434
(1937).
116. O'Leary v. Brown, Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951).

NATURAL

RESOURCES JOURNAL

VOL. 7

a workmen's compensation act to a particular fact situation. In
either case, the adjudicating body determines the facts and interprets them in light of the relevant case or statutory law. If we think
of an adjudicatory function as one a court exercises when it applies
the terms of a statute to a particular set of facts as determined by a
hearing so as to determine the rights of the interested parties, it becomes apparent that administrative agencies are also granted adjudicatory functions by the legislature." Professors Jaffe and Nathanson state:
A court and a compensation board are fundamentally alike in that
they determine controversies under the law upon the basis of evidence
received in a hearing between the parties .

. .

. In this sense both

organs judge and both administer. They are different in that a court
as we know it today is a icourt
of general jurisdiction, the board is
8
restricted to one subject."

Similarly, if we think of legislative functions being exercised by
the legislature when it enacts rules which prescribe approved behavior or proscribe possible disapproved behavior, then, again, it
is apparent that administrative agencies exercise legislative functions in promulgating rules. The courts have come to approve such
delegations of adjudicatory and legislative functions if the final judicial power to determine questions of law is preserved in the courts
and the ultimate legislative control rests with the legislature.
As one authority observes:
There was a time when many state courts insisted that constitutional doctrines precluded the delegation of legislative or judicial
powers to administrative agencies, and as a result many early grants
or power to state agencis were held invalid. But that time has long
passed. Gradually, the sheer, hard logic of the early cases retreated
in the face of the felt necessities of the times. Though the old rubrics
prohibiting delegation are still occasionally repeated, they no longer
shape decision." 9
It is at the juncture where finality of administrative action comes
into question that the separation of powers doctrine becomes crit117. 1 F. Cooper, State Administrative Law 47 (1965).
118.
119.

L. Jaffe & N. Nathanson, Administrative Law 134 (2d ed. 1961).
1 F. Cooper, supra note 117, at 48. (Foonote omitted.)
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ical. In order to avoid the abuse of administrative discretion, the
final legislative power to change the rules must rest in the legislature. In order to correct administrative errors and provide uniformity of interpretation, the final judicial power must rest in the courts.
Chief Justice Vanderbilt in 1949 pointed out that "the proper delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies within the
executive department" did not violate the separation of powers
clause of the New Jersey Constitution because "what the Legislature
delegates it may at any time withdraw."12 The court went on to say
that similarly it was not unconstitutional to grant administrative
agencies adjudicatory functions since "every administrative adjudication is subject to the doctrine of the supremacy of law. .... M21
The courts have taken the position that combining legislative,
executive, and judicial functions is permissible if adequate checks
and balances are provided. "The mere existence of blended powers
has not been a cause of concern. It is only when the blending of
functions creates a danger of unchecked power that concern
arises.' 1 22 In interpreting state constitutions, the courts have concluded that the vesting of judicial power in the courts does not
prohibit the legislatures' granting to administrative agencies' officers the powers indispensably necessary to discharge
their duties23
the powers to decide initially issues of fact and law.
The state and federal courts have avoided the practical and
theoretical impossibility of separating the characteristic functions of
the tripartite organization into logic tight compartments; rather,
they have made sure that the ultimate judicial power to say what is
lawful, the legislative power to control legislation, and the executive
power to execute the laws is preserved in the respective departments
of government.
As a prominent authority on the subject points out:
the state courts have inclined to the view that combination of legislative, prosecutory, and adjudicatory functions in a single agency will
be countenanced where a practical necessity therefor exists, but only
so long as workable checks and balances (such as . .. reasonably
120. Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 2 N.J. 356, 66 A.2d 726,
730 (1949).
121. Id.
122. 1 F. Cooper, supra note 117, at 17. (Footnote omitted.)
123. McGovney, Administrative Decisions and Court Review Thereof, in California, 29 Calif. L. Rev. 110, 145 (1941).
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broad judicial 124
review) exist to guard against abuses of administrative discretion.
An Alabama court probably best stated the constitutional position
in holding that the separation of powers doctrine requires only that
the entire power of one governmental department should not be
exercised by the same body that possesses the entire power of either
of the other departments. The court went on to say "an administrative commission need not be exclusively a branch of the executive,
the legislative or the judicial''department. It can partake of the nature and powers of all three. 125
Three states have included in their constitutions provisions specifically governing the review of judicial functions performed by
administrative agencies. 2 ' This is a healthy practice in that in each
case the constitution realistically recognizes that administrative
agencies do and must exercise "judicial functions." However, in each
instance the "judicial power" to determine finally what is lawful
reposes in the courts. This honesty in constitution writing is commendable; it relieves the courts from strained interpretations
and
127
Of
scrutiny.
critical
withstand
not
do
that
distinctions
fictional
the three constitutional provisions, perhaps the best is that adopted
in 1961 by North Carolina. 2s Article IV § 3 of the North Carolina
Constitution is aptly entitled "Judicial powers of administrative
agencies." It goes on with simplicity and good pragmatic common
sense to grant to the legislature the power to "vest in administrative
agencies . . .such judicial powers as may be reasonably necessary

as an incident to the accomplishment of the purposes for which the
agencies were created," while reserving to the courts judicial review
of agency decisions.
124. 1 F. Cooper, supra note 117, at 17. The courts in exercising judicial review are
more likely to uphold the delegation of judicial functions to administrative agencies
when familiar procedural safeguards are provided. If the statute provides for notice,
hearing, findings, and judicial review, the courts have been willing to uphold the grant
of judicial functions to agencies. See 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 2.10,
at 115 (1958) ; 1 F. Cooper, jupra note 117, at 81-82.
125: Ex parte Darnell, 262 Ala. 71, 76 So.2d 770, 774- (1954).
126. Mich. Const. art. VI, § 28; Mo. Const. art. 5, § 22; N.C. Const. art. IV, § 3.
127. For example the term "quasi-judicial" tends only to conceal the judicial functions that administrative agencies perform.
128. N.C. Const. art. IV, § 3: "Judicial powers of administrative agencies.-The
General Assembly may vest in administrative agencies established pursuant to law
such judicial powers as may be reasonably necessary as an incident to the accomplishment of the purposes for which the agencies were created. Appeals from administrative agencies shall be to the General Court of Justice."
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The simplicity and flexibility of the North Carolina approach is
salutory. Although the North Carolina Constitution does have an
explicit separation of powers clause, Article IV § 3 is not inconsistent. 129 If the distinction between the "judicial power" and "adjudicatory function" is clearly made, Article IV § 3 is perfectly compatible with the doctrine of separation of powers; even though administrative agencies do exercise judicial functions of gathering
facts, holding hearings, and making initial decisions as to the lawfulness of certain types of acts (e.g. whether X, on these facts, exceeds
his gas production quota), the judicial power to ultimately determine what is lawful is lodged in the courts.
The draft proposed by the New Mexico Constitutional Revision
Commission in their 1967 Report, recommends a distribution of
powers clause and a judicial review of administrative decisions
18 0
clause.

The distribution of powers clause recommended by the commission places the judicial power in the judicial branch; the proposed
Article II § 17 is in accord by making "All quasi-judicial decisions of
state administrative agencies and commissions . . . subject to judi-

cial review."
Thus, the draft expressly recognizes the decision-making function
of administrative agencies, but reserves to the courts the judicial
power of final determinations of lawfulness. Under the proposed
draft, administrative agencies could continue to perform those judicial functions reasonably required to accomplish their legislative
mandates. However, in view of the Mechem case,'13 1 it would be
desirable to include a provision similar to Article IV § 3 of the
North Carolina Constitution in order to remove any lingering
confusion.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Not all decisions can be made by the three poles of government,
so we have administrative agencies which in executing the will of the
legislature perform not only executive functions but legislative and
judicial functions as well. This intermixture has caused the courts
129. N.C. Const. art. I, § 8: "The legislative, executive, and judicial powers distinct.-The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the government ought
to be forever separate and distinct from each other."
130. 1967 Report of the Constitutional Revision Comm'n, art. III and art. II, § 17.
131. State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Products Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d
1069 (1957).
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no little consternation and has resulted in the type of confusion of
which the Mechem case in New Mexico is symptomatic.'- 2 The way
out of the confusion lies in clearly distinguishing between the judicial
power and the mere exercise of judicial functions. Even though administrative agencies exercise legislative functions in promulgating
regulations and policy they do so only through authority delegated
to them by the legislature. Thus, the legislative power still reposes
in the legislature. Similarly, administrative agencies carry out functions which are judicial in nature-such as deciding between two
contesting parties as to who on the facts is entitled to carry freight
from Farmington to Gallup; but the judicial power still resides in
the courts to determine ultimately the lawfulness of the decision of
the administrative agencies.
The judicial power is the entire bundle of judicial functions, and
ultimately is the power to make the final determination of lawfulness. Therefore, if the legislature establishes some administrative
agencies which exercise limited adjudicatory functions that are subject to judicial review, the doctrine of separation of powers is not
offended. It is essential that courts retain the power to review for
legality so that we can have uniform principles of interpretation and
to deter abuse of administrative discretion.
The courts are a group of generalists or rationalists sitting on
top of the specialists. The courts deal with the important cases and
thereby generalize and relate the segments of the society to each
other. They provide uniformity in the interpretation of what is
lawful. This is the point of Marbury v. Madison.'3 3 This is what
the judicial power is.
Both courts and administrative agencies are concerned with the
determination of facts. Facts can be divided into two types, 1) historical-was the man drowned? and 2) conclusionary facts-was
the work he was doing within the scope of his employment? There is
nothing to say courts have to determine all historical facts, but it is
important that the courts have the judicial power to review conclusionary facts such as whether the drowning was or was not within
the scope of employment because this involves an interpretation of
the law by measuring the historical facts against a particular statutory expression. It is desirable to have uniformity in the interpretation of the law, and it is necessary to have the checks and balances
called for by the doctrine of separation of powers. There are cogent
132. See K. Davis, Administrative Law Text 43 (1959).
133. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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reasons for taking some of the burden from the courts by using the
administrative process. The line between historical facts and conclusionary facts is a sensible place to draw the demarcation. Historical facts can be dreged up by administrative agencies, but the final
decisions as to conclusionary facts should not be taken from the
courts. The authority for the legislature to give administrative
agencies power to try historical facts is modified by the sixth and
seventh amendments requiring jury trials in civil and criminal cases.
In these two instances, the U.S. Constitution has made a value
judgment that these cases should be tried by jury. 13 4 Professor Jaffe
of Harvard, in summing up the federal law says, "even a suit involving 'private right' . . .may . . .be adjudicated by an agency provided that a court is empowered on appeal to determine the law, and
provided that the matter is not one at 'common law' entitling the
parties to a jury trial."'8 51
The Mechem decision is an aberration. 136 One authority called
it an "astounding holding.' 3 7 Justice Sadler, in his dissent in Mechem, stated, "New Mexico stands alone in the hierarchy of states
holding the legislature lacks power to create an industrial commission to hear and screen for final determination by the courts the
myriad cases, increasing at an alarming rate, annually, under its
workmen's compensation act." 188
In this brief paragraph, Justice Sadler caught the essence of the
argument, i.e., 1) the administrative agency might initially hear the
case, but the judicial power "for final determination by the courts"
was preserved, and 2) the administrative agency would screen
cases so as to conserve the energy and time of the courts for its
generalist duties. He later in his dissent said,
They serve a useful purpose in regulating the activities of a particular
occupation or industry and save the courts the time and labor of
134. See Parker, Separation of Po.,ers, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 1009, 1032 (1951).
135. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 91 (1965).
136. The Mechem decision has not been followed: to do so would jeopardize the
administrative process and thereby the capacity of the government to govern. The
closest the court has come is in the Southwestern Public Service Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa
Growers' Ass'n, 67 N.M. 108, 353 P.2d 62 (1960). In this case the court cited with approval an Oklahoma case that enumerated the private v. public rights distinction of
Mechem.
137. K. Davis, supra note 132, at 47.
138. 63 N.M. at 256, 316 P.2d at 1072. It should be noted, however, that the industrial commissions in a number of states were created by the constitution, not the legislature; see, e.g., Cal. Const. art. 20 § 21 and N.Y. Const. art. I § 18.
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attempting to take over management and regulation of such busi-

nesses and industries. We have the Barbers Board, the Bar Commissioners, the 9 Medical Board, the Real Estate Board and so on ad
3
infinitum.1

At this juncture, when revision of the constitution is being considered, the question arises, what steps should be taken to anticipate and thereby avoid confusion of the Mechem type?
The proposals of the Constitutional Revision Commission contained in their 1967 report expressly provide in proposed Article II
for a separation of powers so that the judicial power to make final
determination as to what is lawful is reserved to the judiciary. Then,
in proposed Article II § 17, they acknowledge the judicial functions
of administrative agencies. Their draft proposes "all quasi-judicial
decisions of the state administrative agencies are subject to judicial
review."
Article III and Article II § 17 as proposed by the Commission are
acceptable and are necessary. However, small changes could strengthen and clarify these sections and the concepts that they express:
1. In order to make the distinction between the "judicial power"
and adjudicatory, i.e. judicial "function,' ' 140 even clearer, Article III
should be changed by simply using the words "the power" instead
of "any power" so that Article III would read as follows:
The powers of government of this state are divided into three dis-

tinct branches of government, the legislative, executive and judicial,
and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of
powers properly belonging to one of these branches, shall exercise

the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in
this constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted.

2. Then, by following the model of the North Carolina constitution the last clear chance for confusion would be removed. This could
be done by changing proposed Article II § 17 to read as follows:
The legislature may vest in administrative agencies such judicial
139. Id. at 259, 316 P.2d at 1075.
140. In the Mechem case, Justice Sadler also quoted Chief Justice Vanderbilt of
New Jersey: "The failure to comprehend that administrative adjudication is not judicial springs from the erroneous notion that all adjudication is judicial. This is not so
and never has been so. . . ." Justice Vanderbilt had grasped the nub of the problem,
and perhaps he would have made his point even more clearly if he had used the labels
"judicial power" and "judicial functions."
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powers as may be reasonably necessary as an incident to the accomplishment of the purposes for which the agencies were created. Decisions
made by administrative agencies and commissions pursuant to their
judicial powers are subject to judicial review. The scope of review
shall be as prescribed by law. In the absence of legislative provisions
the matter shall not be heard de novo upon judicial review.
This proposal largely follows the Commission's draft for Article
17 and makes only judicial decisions by the Administrative
Agencies subject to judicial review because there are those ministerial decisions that perhaps should not be subject to judicial review. Examples of ministerial decisions are the construction of
parking facilities, location of highways, or the accreditation of
schools.
It is desirable to have a simple, straightforward judicial review
section. Some states, such as Missouri, have tried rather elaborate
formulations in spelling out what administrative decisions shall be
reviewable. For example, the Missouri provision states: "All final
decisions, findings, rules and orders of any administrative officer or

II §

body .

.

. which are judicial or quasi-judicial and affect private

rights shall be subject to direct review by the courts as provided by
law. .

.

My own taste is for the simplicity and straightfor-

142
wardness contained in the North Carolina Constitution.
The elaborate administrative review provision in the Missouri
Constitution, in effect since 1945, has been construed by the courts
in at least 165 cases. Such extensive litigation raises some doubt
about the provision's effectiveness. Even with the mass of litigation,
no case has been found that defines the constitutional phrase, "all
final decisions, findings, rules and orders." Since the Michigan con-

141. Missouri Constitution, article V, § 22.
142. Three states, Michigan, Missouri and North Carolina provide within their
constitutions for the judicial review of administrative decisions. The constitutional provisions in two of these states are so new that no adequate judicial construction of the
meaning of these provisions has been enunciated to date. (Michigan's Constitution was
adopted in 1963; the North Carolina provision was added to the North Carolina Constitution in 1962). The North Carolina Constitution, article IV, §3, states: "Judicial
powers of administrative agencies. The General Assembly may vest in administrative
agencies . . . such judicial powers as may be reasonably necessary as an incident to
the accomplishment of the purposes for which the agencies were created. Appeals from
administrative agencies shall be to the General Court of Justice." The Michigan Con-

stitution, article VI, § 28, reads: "All final decisions, findings, rulings, and orders of
any administrative officer or agency existing under the constitution or by law, which
are judicial or quasi-judicial and affect private rights or licenses, shall be subject to
direct review by the courts as provided by law. . ....
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stitutional provision is an almost verbatim copy of the Missouri
provision, one is left wondering if the Michigan courts will be as
hounded for constructions of the provision as have the courts in
Missouri.
By analogy one gains some insight by looking at constructions of
statutory judicial review sections in other jurisdictions. The few
helpful cases found construing the phrase "any decision" generally
recognize that "any decision" is not a literal command, but is meant
to include judicial type decisions, as contrasted with ministerial
acts. 48

The few useful cases found construing the phrase "final order"
suggest that time is the basic element here: the administrative body
involved must have done all that it can do before its decision is
appealable. 4
143. Board of Comm'rs of Dearborn County v. Droege, 224 Ind. 446, 68 N.E.2d
650 (1946). The county commissioners decided that there existed a vacancy on the
Board because one of its members had been committed to an institution for the insane.
They appointed a replacement. HELD: The statute providing for appeal of "any decisions" made by the county commissioners means "judicial decisions and unless the
action of the board was of a judicial character no appeal" was available. The act of
the remaining commissioners was ministerial, not judicial. Therefore, no appeal was
available.
Accord: State ex rel. Sink v. Circuit Court of Cass County, 214 Ind. 323, 15 N.E.2d
624 (1938) (county commissioners created an additional township in the county) and
cases cited therein. ARIZONA reaches essentially the same result (at least in regard
to the agriculture commission) by statutory definitions of "final decision": "any decision, order, or determination of an administrative agency which terminates the proceeding before the agency and as not meaning or including a rule or regulation issued
to implement legislation administered by the agency." Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-901 as paraphrased in Arizona Comm'n of Agriculture and Horticulture v. Jones, 91 Ariz. 183,
370 P.2d 665, 668 (1962).
Another Indiana case: McGraw v. Marion County Plan Comm'n, 174 N.E.2d 757 (Ind.
1961). On the question of whether a recommendation of a Plan Commission was a decision capable of being appealed, the court said: when a statute says "any decision"
it refers "only to judicial decisions, meaning decisions involving a judicial act. [Citing
case.] Purely ministerial decisions or administrative acts are not within the concept of
such terms." [Citing cases] 174 N.E.2d at 760.
144. City of Houston v. Turner, 355 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. 1962). An order of the
Civil Service Commission that made future disposition of a police officer's employment
status dependent upon his behavior during a probationary period was not a "final
order" such as could be reviewed by the courts. To be a final order, there must be
nothing left open for disposition. Where some right is made contingent upon the occurrence of some future event, the order is not final. 355 S.W.2d at 264.
Langer v. Gray, 73 N.D. 437, 15 N.W.2d 732 (1944). In a property tax dispute the
question regarding timeliness of the appeal was answered: Under the rules provided
for appeals the right of appeal is limited to final orders or decisions and orders or decisions substantially affecting the rights of parties. Procedural orders made during the
pending of a hearing are not to be deemed final orders or orders affecting substantial
rights. 15 N.W. 2d at 734.
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Perhaps the whole thing boils down to a matter of taste, but I
think it would be wise to avoid a Missouri type constitutional provision which has generated so much confusion and litigation. The
simplicity of the North Carolina provision is appealing.
3. Then, as a final change, it will be noted that I have removed the
word "quasi" from the proposal for Article II § 17. Since in making
the distinction between "adjudicatory functions" and the "judicial
power" we candidly admit that administrative agencies exercise
judicial functions, it is not necessary to say "quasi-judicial" decisions.
One must admit that the accepted usage of "quasi-judicial" as opposed to "judicial" accomplished the same result but it does so by a
fictitious means. The word "quasi" means "as if" according to
Webster, 145 thereby saying it is like adjudication but, in fact, is not.
This is less than true. The determination of whether or not an employee was acting "within the scope of his employment" is called
"judicial" if made by a court, but "quasi-judicial" if made by an
administrative agency. An administrative agency hears the facts and
measures them by a statutory formula, and thereby adjudicates. It
would therefore be more realistic to discard the "quasi-judicial"
language and candidly use the distinction between the "judicial
power" and "adjudicatory functions."' 4 This would lead to clearer
thinking and less chance for confusion of the type the court embroiled itself in, in the Mechem case. As Professor Cooper points
out, "no court ever succeeded-indeed, none seriously tried-to discover a logical basis for distinguishing between 'pure' and 'quasi'
47
legislative or judicial powers. ' 1

145.
146.
147.

Merriam-Webster New Inr'l. Dictionary 1861 (3d ed. 1961).
McGovney, supra note 123, at 145-46.
F. Cooper, supra note 117, at 51.

